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The Fragile Armistice:
The Legal, Economic, and Policy Implications of
Trading in a Competitor's Stock
Karl T. Muth*
The opportunity to make a profit ... motivate[s] speculators to engage
in the practice of buying and selling [contracts]. A speculator who
owned no present interest . . . but anticipated a price decline might
agree to a future sale at the current market price, intending to purchase
... at a reduced price.... A "short" sale of that kind would result in a
loss if the price went up instead of down. On the other hand, a price
increase would produce a gain for a "long" speculator who had
acquired [the asset] ... but merely for the purpose of reselling ... at
an enhanced price.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether a company's treasury should speculate in the
buying, short-selling, or trading in options on its competitors is one
contemporaneous with the dawn of the modem market instruments.2
Much thought but little legal scholarship has been dedicated to the
question. This Article aims, through the use of examples and analogy,
to demystify the practice of trading in a competitor's stock; analyze the
practice's advantages and disadvantages, and attempt to explain its
* © Karl T. Muth 2008. M.B.A. Candidate, The University of Chicago Booth School of
Business; J.D., The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. Many thanks to my parents,
Edmund H. Muth and Rita D. Tan, for their advice, steadfast support, and limitless patience.
Thanks also to Ashley Cox, Nancy Jack, and the Hon. James A. Shapiro for encouraging my
scholarship, and to Michelle Steiman for sharing her bankruptcy expertise. Elizabeth M. Schutte
contributed many valuable comments on earlier drafts.
1. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1982).
2. In the late seventeenth century, it became clear, first in the commodities markets and more
than a century later in the equities markets, that call and put options would be central to both
market efficiency and the timely setting of accurate prices. An efficient options market leads, in
most cases, to smaller bid-ask spreads in the underlying commodity or stock and serves as a
secondary predictor of future demand. The ability to borrow stock, and hence the ability to sell
short, allows the market to correct for unwarranted enthusiasm or stem upward momentum. As
more complex instruments evolved and traded hands in the marketplace, whether a company with
cash on-hand should hazard treasury funds directly or indirectly on the price of its competitor's
stock quickly became a question of some debate.
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apparent relative rarity. First, the Article seeks to examine the legal
barriers confronting the practice.3  Then, the Article addresses the
question of whether this practice harms the market directly, or the
business "community" more generally.4 Lastly, the Article explores the
question of social norms that define the business community and the
equity markets, and whether prevailing contemporary public policy can
be reconciled with the decision to trade in a competitor's stock.5
II. LEGALITY
Despite -a cornucopia of provided causes of action 6 under section
12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 7 there is no public or private cause of
action that suggests the short-selling8  or buying of puts9  of a
competitor's stock is either unlawful or actionable by that competitor.
If one examines what many agree is the most general portion of the
1933 Act, section 17(a) 10 and its codified progeny' 1-a provision
intended to cover any fraudulent scheme12 in a transaction involving
3. See infra Part II (discussing statutes that address this practice).
4. See infra Parts III, IV (discussing the view that the issue affects the efficiency of the
markets).
5. See infra Parts V, VI (discussing social norms of the business community and public
policy).
6. Causes of action under Section 12(2) allow nearly every imaginable securities derivation of
common law fraud principles, from simple material misrepresentations made to an individual
plaintiff-investor to full-blown fraud-on-the-market scenarios.
7. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2000). For an informative look at Section 12(2), its scope, the
remedies it provides, and the application of this section pre- and post-Gustafson, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231, 1251
(1995); Ted J. Fiflis, Gustafson vs. Alloyd Co., Inc.: Judicial vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEC. REG.
L.J. 423 (1996); Peter V. Letsou, The Scope of Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 95, 96 (1996). A comprehensive understanding of
Section 12(2) is not, however, required for the discussion herein.
8. A short sale is the sale of a borrowed security in which the borrower holds a possessory
interest but no ownership interest. See STEPHEN A. Ross, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD &
JEFFREY JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE 866 (5th ed. 1999). Put another way, a short sale is "[a]
sale of a security that the seller does not own or has not contracted for at the time of the sale, and
that the seller must borrow to make delivery." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1366 (8th ed. 2004).
9. Just as a "call" option allows a participant in the market who holds the option to buy at a
specified "striking" or "exercise" price, a "put" option allows its holder to sell at a given price.
"American" put options allow the holder of the option to exercise it on or before the date on the
put, while "European" put options allow the holder to exercise the option only on one particular
day. For the sake of simplicity, put options described here are presumed to be "European" put
options. There are many further distinctions between "species" of call and put option contracts,
but an elementary understanding of the basic "phyla" is sufficient for this discussion. See DAVID
S. KIDWELL ET AL., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 478-83 (1981).
10. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000).
II. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
12. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that fraud-on-
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securities--even this broadest portion of the Act does not prevent
trading in a competitor's stock.13 Similarly, related federal statutes do
not prevent this activity, whether in the form of a purchase of equity, the
purchase of an option (with leverage or with cash), or a short sale. 14
The securities laws of Japan, for example, appear to have no
prohibition against the practice. 15  British securities law, which is
primarily principles-based16 (as opposed to American securities law,
which is rules-based), makes trades by competitors worthy of no higher
level of scrutiny than trades by others. Nor is the tax treatment of trades
involving a competitor's stock in the United States 17 or the European
Union1 8 any more lenient or punitive than any other investment activity
undertaken by a corporate treasury.
the-market occurs when misrepresentation itself affects market price of security); Regents of Cal.
v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 400 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that fraud is
actionable despite the fact that misrepresentations affected the market only via other co-
conspirator in fraudulent scheme).
13. See generally William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933,
43 YALE L.J. 171, 182 (1933); VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 740 (1st ed. 1972).
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of these purchases to
market efficiency). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78g, 78j(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2008); 12 C.F.R. §§
220.3, 220.4(c)(3)(ii), 220.8(d), 224.2 (2008); 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Oa-1 (2007).
15. In Japan, Articles 164-65, which cover the issues implicated by a short sale scheme, do
not speak to any restriction on short-sales of a competitor's stock. Article 190, now at Article
165, read before its amendment in 1988: "A listed company's officers and major shareholders
shall not sell their company's stock if they do not own the stock." See Tomoko Akashi, Note,
Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1296-1319 (1989). There
was, and is, no explicit prohibition, however, regarding short sales of a competitor's stock in
Japan today.
16. "Principles based" here refers to the British bias that the "spirit of the law" governs in
cases where the securities laws are insufficient or uncertain. In other words, where there was
intent to defraud, it is likely the resulting act will have succeeded in a fraud, even if the exact type
of fraud perpetrated was not afforded space in any statute. Meanwhile, the American system is
strictly rules-based-if a strategy does not violate any explicitly-stated rule, then it is fair game.
See MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US'
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 82 (2007), http://crapo.senate.gov/documents/
mckinsey.report.pdf.
17. "For the purpose of this title . . . gains or losses from short sales of property shall be
considered as gains or losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets .... 26 U.S.C.A. 1233(a)
(West 2002).
18. See COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATORS, CESR'S REPORT ON THE SUPERVISORY
FUNCTIONING OF THE PROSPECTUS DERIVATIVE AND REGULATION 8-15, 17 (2007), available at
http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=homedetails&id=219.
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So long as there is no fraud, 19 manipulation,2 ° or intent to deceive21
the market, 22 and so long as proper disclosures are made, there is no law
barring the purchase or trading of a competitor's stock in the United
States. There are no laws prohibiting the purchase of options-
including put options-on a competitor's stock. Nor are there any laws,
NYSE regulations, SEC,2 3 or NASD prohibitions against short sales of
a company's stock by one of its competitors in the marketplace. In fact,
there are only a few extremely narrow scenarios 24 in which short-selling
of a competitor's stock is prohibited in the United States. One such
scenario is where the short-sale is meant to drive down the price of a
target company in a tender offer situation, 25 which would offend SEC
Rule 14e-4 (formerly lOb-4).26 The discussion that follows primarily
addresses legal actions that could be taken by a publicly-traded
corporation with regard to a publicly-traded competitor's stock.
III. A POTENTIAL THREAT TO EFFICIENT MARKETS?
"[T]he welfare of investors and financial intermediaries are
inextricably linked[;] frauds perpetrated upon either business[es] or
investors can redound to the detriment of the other and to the economy
as a whole." 27
19. Fraudulent short-selling is a criminal offense and not a matter this Article is meant to
address. Of course, not all short-selling is fraudulent. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S.
768, 776 n.7 (1979) (drawing this distinction as to respondent's conviction). This Article deals
solely with activities not barred by applicable law.
20. Fraud and manipulation here refers to the general set of practices, and those stemming
from them, described in McKinney's General Business Law Ch. 20, Art. 23 § 352-C.
21. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185
(1994).
22. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,476 (1977).
23. It is important to note that the SEC has no jurisdiction or capacity to pursue criminal
matters. Criminal complaints regarding securities law violations, when they occur, are pursued
by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney General. Rather, the SEC can bring
enforcement actions as a plaintiff in federal district court or can bring an administrative action
before an SEC administrative law judge (AU). See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 2, 2008).
24. Other short-selling scenarios prohibited in the United States are even more specific, such
as short sales by underwriters or dealers from the offering that occur during the pre-offering filing
period, which would offend Rule 105, Regulation M.
25. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir.
1986) (discussing the SEC's reasons for adopting Rule lOb-5, one of which was to discourage
"short tenders" and "hedged tenders").
26. SEC Rule 14e-4, known colloquially as the "short tender rule," generally prohibits an
actor from tendering more shares than he or she owns. The short tender rule now appears at 17
CFR 240.14e-4.
27. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 776 (1979).
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Some may fear that trading on a given company's doubts about a
competitor's stock could lead to fraud and insider trading.28 This would
be exceedingly rare, as 1) rival corporations are very rarely privy to the
opinions of insiders at the target corporation; and 2) corporations are
unlikely to collude where the collusion would lead to the devaluing of
one corporation's stock. The only situation where this occurs with any
appreciable frequency seems to be where the corporation participating
in short-selling of the publicly-traded rival is not a true rival or peer.
Often the "rival" corporations participating in short-selling in these
(rare) cases are probably closely-held or might even take the form of a
single-member limited liability company. These may be corporations
controlled by insiders or those with inside information and are not true
"competitors" to the company affected by the short-selling, even if they
reside in the same market. For instance, a privately-held manufacturer
of DVD players with a few dozen employees and five million dollars in
sales might nominally exist in the same market as Sony, but is not a
"competitor" in any economically-relevant sense of the word. Because
two companies can interact as peers in the marketplace even when they
are not peers in their industry, the market may be seen as the
battleground of choice for cash-flush new entrants29 or cash-reserves-
heavy incumbents. 30
A relevant example is the case of Enron, where the short positions
held, in aggregate, were quite significant as a portion of Enron's total
outstanding shares.31 Some short positions seem to have been held by
partnerships and shell companies that co-existed in the energy market
but were not peers of-or wholly independent of-Enron.32 Many of
these companies, the government alleged, were created to facilitate
insider trading or created as "favors" by banks friendly to Enron's
28. Many scholars believed this in the 1980s and 1990s. However, this theory that short sale
transactions are often (or even predominantly, as some contended) based on private or near-
private information has been largely discredited in recent years. See, e.g., Holger Daske, Scott A.
Richardson & A. Irem Tuna, Do Short Sale Transactions Precede Bad News Events? (May 13,
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=722242 (examining data
covering 4,193 NYSE-listed securities and finding no substantial correlation between short sale
transactions and significant negative news events, inconsistent with earlier work suggesting
private information's being among primary drivers of short sale behavior).
29. An oft-cited example of this is AOL's use of its large cash position to acquire Time-
Warner, an enterprise many times its size only a few years earlier.
30. An incumbent with substantial market share in a mature market may have steady cash
flows and be more willing to make aggressive investments.
31. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 753 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
32. See Press Release, Univ. of Cal. Office of the President, UC Reaches $2 Billion
Settlement With Citigroup in Enron Securities Class Action, (June 10, 2005), available at
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/2005/junl0.html.
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schemes.33  This raises the question of whether a large enough short
position, as a percentage of shares outstanding alone, might create the
fraud-on-the-market presumption in rule 10(b), in the absence of further
findings of fact or expert testimony to that effect. The United States
Court of Appeals has never definitively decided this issue. While the
Cammer/34Unger/35Bel136 factors 37 can be used to analyze whether an
efficient market38 exists, these factors do not establish whether the
efficient market under examination is vulnerable to tampering through
short-selling by competitors and insiders.
For example, even though the annualized turnover ratio was 151.9%
in Enron's stock (seemingly suggestive of an efficient market and
greater than the average for all stocks listed on the NYSE at the time),
we now know there was substantial impact from inappropriate trading
by insiders, if not competitors. 39 The short interest in Enron stock
represented only about 1% of outstanding shares40 until October 1,
2001.41 Short interest represented 2.4% of shares outstanding on
33. See Press Release, Univ. of Cal. Office of the President, Former Enron Chief Fastow
Testimony Makes Clear That Enron's Banks Were the Real Masterminds Behind the Schemes to
Defraud Investors (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/
2006/sep26.html.
34. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
35. Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005).
36. Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV0166N, 2004 WL 1490009 (N.D.
Tex. July 1, 2004).
37. These factors help courts analyze whether a stock is trading in an efficient market and
whether a fraud-on-the-market theory or presumption is an appropriate framework for continuing
an analysis. The satisfaction of any or all of the factors does not, however, confer or remove any
liability by itself. The factors are: (1) the average weekly trading volume compared to the total
outstanding shares; (2) the availability of industry professionals following and reporting on the
stock; (3) the extent to which market makers and arbitrageurs trade in or interfere with the market
for the stock; (4) the company's eligibility to file SEC Form S-3; (5) the existence of facts
"showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial
releases and an immediate response in the stock price"; (6) the company's total market
capitalization; (7) the range and volatility of bid-ask spreads in the stock; and (8) the stock's total
market trading volume once insider trading has been subtracted. See Unger, 401 F.3d at 323
(citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286-87). Consider also the latter factors added here in view of
Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467,477-78 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
38. Standards applied by courts for examining whether a market is efficient vary somewhat.
See generally Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 1264; Krogman, 202 F.R.D. 467. For an explanation in the
context of securities class action litigation see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Stephen Paulovic, Class
Certification: Developments Over the Last Five Years 2002-2007; The Future of Class Actions
193, 225 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 14175, 2008),
WL 777 PLI/LIT 193.
39. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
40. This appears to have been a relatively consistent figure month-to-month prior to Q401.
See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
41. Id.
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October 15, 2001; 4.1% of shares outstanding on November 15, 2001;
and 11.8% of shares outstanding on December 15, 2001.42 Despite
voluminous discovery in the many securities cases that followed the
Enron collapse, the staggering portion-over 10%-of Enron's shares
outstanding mirrored by short interest in December 2001 remains a
mystery. Only a small portion of the questionable equities and option
activity has ever been reliably attributed to trades made by Enron's
insiders.43 This leaves open the question of how much of the activity
can be properly attributed to the corporate treasuries of partners and
competitors.
However, this scenario of substantial short positions being held in the
market generally is different and distinguishable from a scenario where
a substantial short position is held by a competitor. In fact, the
frequency of legitimate, lawful short sales so overwhelmingly outpaces
the frequency of questionable short sales that short-selling in a given
stock will not start the statute of limitations for a potential lOb-5
securities fraud plaintiff because short-selling alone-no matter who is
doing the short-selling or how publicized it becomes-is not enough to
provide notice that a fraud might be afoot.4 4  Further, insofar as the
plaintiff was on notice of the occurrence of short-selling, the plaintiff is
unlikely to be found to have been deceived by the party engaging in the
short-selling.45  The environment for plaintiffs in this area is a harsh
one.
46
As corporations generally want to execute on their core business
strategies, rather than become long-term holders of shares or options in
42. Id.
43. See generally Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005); Newby v.
Enron Corp., 302 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Skilling, No. Crim. H-04-025, 2006
WL 3030721 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2006); In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 376 B.R. 442
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
44. Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.,
concurring).
45. Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1995).
46. A plaintiff must plead and prove loss causation in securities fraud cases and that the
corporate actor acted with scienter, though most agree that a plaintiff need not prove that any
particular individual acted or undertook to act with scienter. What this means, when combined
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the PLSRA, is that a plaintiff must show each
misleading statement that led to the fraud and show that the misrepresentations were the
proximate cause of the particular loss the plaintiff seeks to recover. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345-46 (2005) (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(l), 4(b)(4) (2000));
Jennifer O'Hare, Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule J0b-5, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 521, 548 n. 142
(2008) (noting Congress appreciates but has chosen not to substantially lower plaintiff pleading
hurdles); Tad E. Thompson, Messin' with Texas: How the Fifth Circuit's Decision in Oscar
Private Equity Misinterprets the Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1086, 1100
(2008) (noting difficulty for plaintiffs under modem fraud interpretation).
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their competitors, it seems likely a corporation will only buy, short, or
buy options on direct competitors where there is substantial certainty
that a change in the industry or sector will occur within a certain time.
The two obvious times in which this would be true would be when a
company makes unexpected earnings announcements or major product
launches. The following hypothetical explores the product launch as an
underlying trigger for this type of trading behavior and the associated
problems that might quickly present themselves.
Example I. The Product Launch Scenario.
As business schools have yet to produce any full-fledged case studies
on point, a simple piece of historical fiction may be the next best way to
explore the practical effects of this strategy.
To indulge in a simplified hypothetical, assume there are three actors,
Apple Computer (AAPL), Research In Motion, Ltd. (RIMM), and
AT&T (T), with the following rules:
" AAPL manufactures a cellular telephone called the iPhone;47
* RIMM competes with AAPL with a product called the
BlackBerry; 48 and
* T provides service for all AAPL cellular telephones and some
RIMM cellular telephones.
Further:
" The exclusive provider of iPhone service in the United States
market is T;
* The universe for this hypothetical is limited to the United
States market;
* By AAPL's June 28, 2007 projections, at least 75% of iPhone
sales will come at the expense of RIMM sales;
* By RIMM's June 28, 2007 projections, its business will be
largely unaffected by the iPhone because the BlackBerry is
aimed at a business market, while the iPhone will primarily
appeal to a youth consumer market; and
* Every iPhone sold results in the origination or renewal of a T
service contract.
47. "iPhone" is a registered set of trademarks of Cisco Systems, Inc. and Apple, Inc. Serial
75076573, Filed Mar. 20, 1996, available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?
f=doc&state=v0lqlo.2.1, and Serial 77504620, Filed June 20, 2008, available at
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f=doc&state=ihpOln.3.13, belonging to Cisco Systems and
Apple, Inc., respectively.
48. "BlackBerry," "BlackBerry Curve," and other related marks are registered trademarks of
Research In Motion Limited Corporation Canada. See, e.g., Serial 77289905, available at
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=vO1qlo.4.1, Filed September 26, 2007, et alia.
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On June 1, 2007, AAPL executives are 75% sure49 that the iPhone,
when made available to consumers on June 29, 2007, will be a success,
benefiting T and AAPL to RJIMM's detriment. On June 15, 2007,
AAPL executives are 80% sure this will be the case. AAPL's board of
directors authorizes the corporate treasury to purchase puts on RIMM
stock and to purchase T stock in the week before the iPhone's debut
based on estimates and models that RIMM will decline 20% during the
ninety days after the iPhone's release, while T will gain 5% during that
period. It is worth noting that, by the benchmarks used by most legal
scholars, while AAPL's board is very well-informed, it is not acting as a
manipulator. 50 The board's goal is not to influence pricing, but to profit
from anticipated, independent market phenomena. 51
In fact,52 the iPhone's launch seemed to have a negligible impact on
RIMM's stock price, and the ninety days following the iPhone's release
were kind to RIMM. RIMM's stock climbed 53 from $65.29 (the
opening price the Friday the iPhone launched) to a closing price of
$72.66 the following Friday, eventually reaching $100.00 per share in
mid-day trading on September 26, 2007, and opening at $100.89 the
following morning after a ninety-day steady climb.
54
Meanwhile, T traded essentially flat 55 during that ninety-day period,
despite strong iPhone sales. T traded between $22 and $25 per share
49. The percentages and assumptions used in this example are arbitrary and purely fictional.
The use of actual ticker symbols and products is purely for illustrative and contextual purposes.
50. Omri Yadlin, Is Stock Manipulation Bad- Questioning the Conventional Wisdom with the
Evidence from the Israeli Experience, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 839, 842 (2001) (stating that
"manipulators trade for the purpose of affecting the market price.").
51. For an interpretation of the distinction between manipulators and non-manipulators
specific to futures markets, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the
Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 J. BUS. L. 103 (1986). Where a trader merely discounts
information into options pricing, the trader is generally contributing to efficiency and not
manipulating the market.
52. All actual market prices cited here are actual market prices available to the public free of
charge from NYSE/Euronext's official market price records. These records include, and are
sympathetic to, the records kept by NASDAQ. For example, see http://www.nyse.coml
about/listed/lcddata.html?ticker=-AAPL for AAPL (a NASDAQ-traded issue accessible through
the NYSE/Euronext online tool). For extended date ranges, citations are to Yahoo! Finance
simply because it creates a useful time series table free of charge from the same data, not because
it draws from any unique data set.
53. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=RIMM&a=05&b=29&c=2007&d--08
&e =28&f=2007&g=d (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). This website gives the open, high, low, close,
volume, and adjusted close prices for RIMM for June 29, 2007, through September 28, 2007. Id.
54. See Jeff Gamet, Analyst: AAPL to Hit $300 (Dec. 27, 2007), http://www.macobserver
.constockwatch/2007/12i27.2.shtml (Georges Yared, CIO of Yared Investment Research, stated
that, because Apple's stock had plenty of momentum in late 2007, he raised Apple's target price
to $300/share).
55. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.comq/hp?s=T&a--05&b=29&c=2007&d--08&e=
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every day, opening the day of the iPhone launch at $24.75 and closing
on Friday, September 28, 2007 at $23.82.
At the end of the period, though the iPhone has been a wildly
successful product and AAPL is often selling every unit it can build,
AAPL's puts are out of the money and its T stock has failed to perform.
If AAPL had simply purchased its own stock, which opened at $121.97
per share on iPhone launch day, and held it for the same ninety-day
period, it could have sold on Friday, September, 28 for between $152.75
and $154.60 per share on that day. 56
Now, the market is not a vacuum, 57 but assuming the amounts of
stock involved in AAPL's strategy would not have been great enough to
substantially affect market activity during the period, it is safe to say
that AAPL would have been better off buying back its own stock than
buying puts on RIMM and buying shares in its partner, T. However, the
situation for AAPL would have been much worse if it had elected
instead to engage in short sales of RIMM, as AAPL'would later have
had to buy RIMM stock at close to $100 per share in order to cover its
short-selling. "[W]hen a hedger takes a long or a short position that is
greater than its interest ... it is to that extent no longer a hedger, but a
speculator."58 It would be almost impossible for RIM\4M to prove that
AAPL harmed RIMM post hoc. After the short-selling scheme failed,
even if RIMM uncovered all facts given here, a suit by RIMM against
AAPL would have been unlikely to survive summary judgment under
any cause of action.
28&f=2007&g=d (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). This website gives the open, high, low, close,
volume, and adjusted close prices for T for June 29, 2007, through September 28, 2007. Id. Note
that these numbers will not exactly match those in the discussion supra, as they have been
adjusted for splits and dividend decisions.
56. Id.
57. "The suspect will often contribute in some way to the price change. Sometimes, while he
is not completely responsible for the price change, the suspected trader might have: (1)
reinforced, (2) stabilized, or (3) created a price change. The trader reinforces a price change
when he brings about a price change that is larger than it would be without X', stabilizes a price
change when the price change is weaker than it would be without X', and creates a price change
when he is fully responsible for the complete price change. For that reason, when a regulator
suspects X of manipulating the price, because, for example, the regulator observes no price
change or a large price change when he expects otherwise, he cannot decide the direction or the
extent of X' just by looking at the stock price behavior." Maithijs Nelemans, Redefining Trade-
Based Market Manipulation, 42 VAL. U. L. REv. 1169, 1180 (2008). C.f United States v.
Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 380 (1970) (acknowledging, in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan, that even minor actions and competitive practices by third parties can
affect other actors' market power).
58. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 360 n.10 (1982).
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IV. SOCIAL NORMS IN THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
Some believe the practice of buying put options on a rival company's
stock to be unfair5 9 or morally objectionable. 60 The same people, when
asked about short sales of a competitor's stock, are likely to find such
actions incrementally "worse" than buying puts. These reactions have
little to do with law and much more to do with business culture and
social norms in the business community.
A norm can be understood as a rule that distinguishes desirable and
undesirable behavior and gives a third party the authority to punish a
person who engages in the undesirable behavior.... [A] norm is like a
law, except that a private person sanctions the violator of a norm,
whereas a state actor sanctions the violator of a law. 61
This may, at least in part, explain the rarity of the practice. 62 If a
company was fantastically successful with a short-selling strategy and,
in a given year, a substantial measure of its profits came from shorting
its nearest competitor, this might be seen as inequitable or "foul play"
by the company's peers and the public, even if the actions taken were
neither criminal nor tortious.
One of the first things Jeff Skilling did after leaving Enron was to
engage in a short sale on August 24, 2001, of AES, an Enron
competitor. Due to the subsequent fall in AES's stock, the value of the
sale was likely between fifteen and thirty million dollars.63 The Wall
Street Journal promptly published an article 64 documenting Mr.
59. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d .Cir. 1979)
(stating that it is unfair practice to trade in competitor's debt and equity to the extent that power
over competitor is gained); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, 179-83 (E.D. Mich.
1960) (stating that it is an unfair practice to impact competitors' shareholders equity in any way
that could influence competitiveness).
60. Objectionable practices that constitute unfair or impermissible strategic behavior as to
debt, equity, and options trading are customarily defined by administrative agency challenges.
See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Corp., Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact
Statement, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,581, 584-86 (D.O.J. Rel. 2000); United States v. The Gillette
Companies, 1990 Impact Statement, 55 Fed. Reg. 12,567 (D.O.J. Rel. 1990).
61. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699
(1996).
62. Much research in many areas of scholarship suggests that actors fear outwardly
representing nonconformity to accepted or prevailing norms. See, e.g., Manav Bhatnagar,
Identifying the Identified: The Census, Race, and the Myth of Self-Classification, 13 TEX. J. C.L.
& C.R. 85, 96-98 (2007); Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 115, 152-53 (2008); William B. Turner, "A Bulwark Against Anarchy":
Affirmative Action, Emory Law School, and Southern Self-Help, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 195, 242 (2008).
63. Ken Brown, Enron Ex-CEO Made Sideline Bet vs. Rival, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002, at
Cl.
64. Id.
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Skilling's successful trade. That the Wall Street Journal found the trade
newsworthy is, in itself, telling as to the business community's attitude
toward this behavior. In the aftermath of Enron, though supporting
reforms, Alan Greenspan admitted that Congress was unable to
"effectively legislate morality or character."65
This surprisingly uniform concept that certain practices by corporate
treasuries, though legal, may be unfair, demonstrates the distinction
between the "letter" and the "spirit" of American securities law.
Specifically, the intent-rather than the wording-of the 1934 Act
seems to have been broadly adopted by those in the market as the "rules
of the game." As the Supreme Court noted, the 1934 Act and its
companion legislative enactments embrace a "fundamental purpose...
to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry."66  The collateral nature of contributing to or
profiting from a rival's failure through the securities markets rather than
through the marketplace is morally unappealing to many who believe
the company with the best product should prevail, rather than the
company that dabbled in (or tampered with) its opponent's stock most
successfully. 67  This might be especially true in cases where a
competitor engages in trades in order to take advantage of a specific
event or temporary misfortune of the target competitor. 68
Example II. The Specific Event Hypothetical: A "9/11" trade.
If a rival air carrier, Unfriendly Skies, had somehow bought 120-day
puts on United Airlines (UAL) at the start of the September 11-14, 2001
NYSE 69 markets-closed period, and the action had been substantial and
came to light, would the buyer of the puts be expected to show remorse
for helping plunge its competitor, UAL, into bankruptcy? Would the
gains (substantial, as UAL fell from a price around $30 per share to
65. George Hager, Fed Chief Expresses Guarded Optimism, USA TODAY, July 17, 2002, at
Al.
66. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
67. Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held
Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 427 (1991) ("While popular criticism of short-selling often
reflects little more than a distaste for those who would profit from the misfortunes of others, short
selling by corporate managers poses more concrete problems.") (emphasis added).
68. Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman, Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235, 281
(2001) ("[T]he possibility of gains from substitute stock trading has the potential to distort
business decisionmaking.").
69. "Short of a patent fraud or obvious wrongful application of its constitution or regulations,
the courts should leave such associations (stock exchanges) to apply their own regulations."
Aronson v. McCormick, 178 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (quoting Cohen v. Thomas, 209
N.Y. 407, 411 (1913)).
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roughly half that at the end of the period, if one examines UAL NYSE
closing prices across this date range) outweigh criticism from investors,
the public, and the press during United Airlines' bankruptcy?
The legal concepts of disclosure in bankruptcy are important when a
corporation considers whether to short its competitor. This is because
courts that apply a broad ownership disclosure rule 70 to a Chapter 11
bankruptcy might require the disclosure of short sales, derivatives, and
interests in a competitor (including short interests and obligations
stemming from put options).7 1 This type of disclosure in the context of
bankruptcy is the likely situation in which a competitor's short strategy
would come to light. Because bankruptcy courts must respect the laws
of the states in which they sit, 72 there is little in the way of settled law
regarding the breadth of ownership disclosure. The bankruptcy court
for the Southern District of New York, for instance, applies the
beneficial ownership disclosure rule it infers from rule 13d-3(a)-(b) in
tandem with the Adoption of Beneficial Ownership Disclosure
Requirements, 73 leading to uncertain results for those seeking full
disclosure. The New York state rules would be narrow enough,74 as
generally applied, in terms of requisite disclosure requirements to
potentially conceal the existence of short sales by competitors while the
company in question was en route to bankruptcy. As the focus of
disclosure in bankruptcy is to discover all assets and debts, rather than
70. The breadth of the requisite disclosure is increasingly often a point of contention, as the
creditors' committee in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy has a fiduciary duty to the creditors it represents,
but not to the debtor. ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §
1103.05(g)(ii)(2)(a) (15th ed., rev. 2007). Therefore, releasing information that may be in the
interest of a creditor, yet embarrassing to the same creditor, poses a difficult quandary for both
the court and the committee. The committee has a responsibility to keep private all sensitive
information, but trades made by competitors in open markets may not be classified as such
because they are matters of record.
71. Kevin J. Coco, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and Ownership
Disclosure in Chapter II Cases, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 610, 652 (2008).
72. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) ("Congress has generally left the
determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law."); In re Payless
Cashways, 203 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (bankruptcy court must apply choice of law rules
of state where it sits); In re Jason Realty, L.P., 59 F.3d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1995) (bankruptcy court
cannot "upend the property law of the state" in which it sits); Matter of Wheaton Oaks Office
Partners, Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1234, 1241 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
73. Adoption of Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release Nos.
33-5808; 34-13291,42 Fed. Reg. 12-342, 12-344 (Mar, 3, 1977).
74. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 130 (availability of sanctions); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 670.2(g) (disclosures
required of counsel); CPLR §§ 3101 (scope of requisite disclosure); 3102 (methods of obtaining
discovery and requests for admission); 3103 (special and protective orders); 3104 (disclosure
oversight and supervision); 3105-3123 (depositions, discovery, supervision, and objections);
3124 (failure to disclose, procedure to compel); 3126 (penalties for failure to comply with
required disclosure; read in concert with 3101).
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all interim interests, a bankruptcy court has little reason to delve into
every passing interest. However, if a competitor was to borrow a large
amount of stock and that stock had "gone missing," 75 this might require
additional diligence from the bankruptcy court. In such a scenario, it
seems incrementally more likely the competitor-borrower would be
discovered.
The concerns regarding public relations if a short-selling strategy
were uncovered are obvious: to the public, short-selling of a struggling
competitor might seem like piling-on or immoral, calculated behavior.
Often, the public expects regret for harm, whether it is criminally or
legally effectuated-particularly when the harm caused is the result of a
calculated plan. "A person who kills while angry is usually guilty of a
less serious crime than a person who kills in a calm, unemotional state
... 76 The emotional reaction to a given course of action by another is
usually based upon complex beliefs.77 However, the fact that some may
find aggressive trading in a competitor's stock morally objectionable
should not animate the legislature to make the practice illegal. "A core
presumption underlying modern legality is that ... the sphere of law
admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion
from creeping in where it does not belong." 78 Not all things that might
be perceived as unfair or wrongful are unlawful 79 or tortious.
80
There are also suspicions in the business community that the SEC
will discover (or manufacture) reasons to pursue corporations that
engage in activity poisonous to the value of its competitors. This likely
overestimates the risk involved and disregards the overarching rule of
criminal prosecutions that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." 81 This means that a
criminal defendant should not "be subjected to a penalty unless the
75. An entity that borrows stock of Company A, sells it short, and still has not bought
replacement "make good" shares of Company A at the time Company A becomes insolvent may
take its gains "free and clear" without buying "make good" Company A shares.
76. Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1977 (2001).
77. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of Judging, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 23,
25 n.6 (1996).
78. Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120 (2006).
79. State Farm Fire & Cas. v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234 (Ct. App. 1996) ("A
practice [can be] 'unfair' or 'deceptive' [but] not 'unlawful' and vice versa.") (quoting Motors,
Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 n.2 (1980)).
80. Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A wrong does not become a
'tort' until an injury has occurred (speeding is wrongful, but not tortious, if no one is injured).").
81. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401
U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
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words of [a] statute plainly impose it."82  While the possibility exists
that a maverick prosecutor, given the right fact pattern, would
misconstrue a statute to allow the prosecution of a corporation trading in
the stock of its competitor, this possibility seems remote. Even if one
takes into account the fears of negative publicity and civil remedies,
these fears alone do not explain the apparent scarcity of this activity in
the marketplace.
On Tuesday, July 15, 2008,83 the SEC issued an emergency order8 4
putting a halt to short-selling in Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
seventeen financial firms 85 including Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,
82. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971) (quoting Keppel v. Tiffin Sav.
Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905)).
83. Though SEC Chairman Christopher Cox announced the order on July 15, 2008, the order
did not take effect until 12:01 a.m. EDT on Monday, July 21, 2008. Press Release, SEC, SEC
Enhances Investor Protections Against Naked Short Selling (July 15, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-143.htm [hereinafter Press Release].
84. The SEC cited the threat of sudden and excessive fluctuations that posed a threat to
markets for its instating the July 15, 2008 emergency order. Such orders are within the SEC's
powers under Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. This order
was later extended. For the SEC's announcement, see Press Release, supra note 83. For the
pertinent Order, see Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market
Developments, Exchange Act Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379 (July 15, 2008), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58166.pdf. For the Amendment, see Amendment to
Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,190, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,837 (July 18, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/2008/34-58190.pdf. The SEC further extended its Emergency Order via a press
release on October 1, 2008 so that the Emergency Order would continue to "allow time for
completion of work on the anticipated passage of legislation." Press Release, SEC, Statement of
SEC Concerning Short Selling and Issuer Stock Repurchases (Oct. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-235.htm. See also SEC Div. of Trading and Markets,
Guidance Regarding the Commission's Emergency Order Concerning Short Selling,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreglemordershortsalesfaq.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
[hereinafter Guidance Concerning Order] (discussing the extension of Emergency orders
including the extension of limitations on short-selling in the stocks of financial firms by rival
financial firms). See Order Extending Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58723, 73
Fed. Reg. 58,994 (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58723.pdf.
The extension also generally includes the requirement of temporary Form SH filing requirements,
which require short sale disclosure from institutional investors. The Form SH disclosures will, at
least for the moment, not be available to the public. See id. (announcing this decision). Since the
implementation of new Form SH requirements, the SEC has also changed the form itself and the
instructions to be followed in completing the form. See SEC, Weekly Report of Short Sales and
Short Positions (Temporary Form SH), http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/ formsh.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2008); SEC, Form SH Instructions, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formshinstructions
.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2008). The Emergency Order was finally allowed to expire at 11:59 p.m.
EDT on Wednesday, October 8, 2008. Kevin McCoy, Lifting Ban Didn't Spark Short-Selling,
USA TODAY, October 13, 2008, at lB.
85. The seventeen financial firms named in the order were BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
(BNPQF or BNPQY), Bank of America Corporation (BAC), Barclays PLC (BCS), Citigroup Inc.
(C), Credit Suisse Group (CS), Daiwa Securities Group Inc. (DSECY), Deutsche Bank Group AG
(DB), Allianz SE (AZ), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Royal Bank ADS (RBS), HSBC
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Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and Merrill Lynch & Co.86 It is
unclear whether, or to what extent, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
seventeen parent companies of primary dealers mentioned in the order
were shorted by their competitors prior to the July 15, 2008 order.
What is clear, however, is that Lehman Brothers suspected certain
hedge funds of shorting its stock and called for an SEC investigation. 87
The full list of names Lehman Brothers gave to the SEC is not, as of
this writing, publicly available. However, the likelihood that none of
these hedge funds have any ties to Lehman's rivals is very tiny indeed,
as the autonomy that hedge funds enjoy relative to the world of major
banking enterprises is often slight at its maximum. 88 The crisis in this
part of the financial markets continued that month, causing the SEC to
issue an order on July 29, 2008 extending the original emergency order
through Tuesday, August 12, 2008.89 Further extensions followed amid
significant debate as to whether, and to what extent, short-selling might
be reined-in through legislation or exchange rulemaking.
The idea that short-selling is abused and should be subject to
restriction is not a new one:
Mr. Untermeyer correctly states that the Stock Exchange itself "has it
within its power to prevent or restrict short selling." Yet even so
hostile a critic as he has heretofore been of Stock Exchange machinery
is careful to add that whether such action would be advisable "is quite
another thing." The stock Exchange authorities have given public
warning that the speculative seller of stocks whose purposes were
shown by deliberate circulation of disturbing rumors would be
severely disciplined. But they too have declared through their
president that since "normal short selling is an essential part of a free
market for securities," prohibition of such sales "might result in the
destruction of the market," and would therefore, in any case [be] "too
Holdings PLC ADS (HBC and HSI), J. P. Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. (LEH), Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (MER), Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. (MFG),
Morgan Stanley (MS), UBS AG (UBS), Freddie Mac (FRE), and Fannie Mae (FNM).
Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379 (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
other/2008/34-58166.pdf.
86. Kara Scannell & Jenny Strasburg, SEC Moves to Curb Short Selling, WALL ST. J., July 16,
2008, at Al.
87. Ben White, Lehman Speculation Blamed on Short-Sellers, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2008,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/l I f34932-4795- I1 dd-93ca-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=l.
88. David Wighton, Did Mayfair Hedge Funds Play Fair by Short-Selling HBOS Shares?,
TIMES (London), Sept. 19, 2008, at 6, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
business/industry.sectors/banking-andfinance/article4783638.ece.
89. Order Extending Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,248, 73 Fed. Reg.
45,257 (July 29, 2008), available at http:lwww.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/34-58248.pdf.
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high a price to pay for the elimination of the few who abuse this
legitimate practice." 9
0
This editorial commentary appeared in the New York Times not in
October 2008, but rather on October 18, 1930.91 The government's
decision to intervene in 2008, and only as to certain companies in the
financial services industry, led to an order with far more complex
considerations than the blanket restriction considered in 1930.92
Hence, the details of this emergency order are worthy of examination.
The order did not halt trading in any particular security.93 Rather, it
required that no one affect a short sale in any of the named securities
without 1) borrowing the securities prior to the short sale date, and 2)
having the capacity to deliver the securities on the settlement date.
94
These restrictions did not, however, apply to market makers, block
positioners, or others who might need to sell short in order to participate
in market-making, hedging, or authoring derivatives based on the
named securities. 95 In essence, it was a stricter requirement than that
contained in rule 203(b)(1) of SEC Regulation SHO,96 and it affected
most actors in the market. This may be the only example in U.S. history
where an action by a government agency created a situation where
essentially only actors related to a company's competitors (other major
players in the financial services industry) could short-sell its stock.
The idea of a conspiracy to control market activity and drive the price
of a stock downward is not a new one.97 In order to prevent an
90. Editorial, Short Selling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1930, at 12.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Guidance Concerning Order, supra note 84 (setting forth questions and answers
concerning the Order).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Winston & Strawn LLP, SEC Extends Emergency Order Restricting Short Sales of GSEs
and Primary Dealers, July 2008, at 1, available at http://interact.winston.com/reaction/
FinancialServices/ClientBriefingsNewsletters/2008/SEC-Extends-Emergency-Order-07-3 08/
SECExtendsEmergencyOrder.pdf.
96. Under the Rule, a broker or dealer may partake in the short-selling of an equity security
for its own account or its customers' accounts where "reasonable grounds [exist] to believe that
the security can be borrowed so that it can be delivered on the date delivery is due." 17 C.F.R. §
242.203 (2008); Securities and Exchange Commission, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008 (Aug. 6, 2004) (to be
codified at 17 CFR pts. 240, 241, 242) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/finalU34-50103.pdf.
See also SEC Division of Market Regulation. Key Points About Regulation SHO,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); SEC, Spotlight On:
Short Sales, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/shortsales.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
97. See generally Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (holding that
manipulation and cornering of the grain market was contrary to public policy and violated Grain
Futures Act); Logan County Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67 (1891) (finding that a bank
improperly bought and sold debt instruments to carry out a scheme to manipulate market in
2009l
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 40
orchestrated run to sink a stock's price-with those holding short
positions making money on the way down-short-selling of equities
instruments in the American market was controlled from 1939 to June
2007 by the "tick test" rule. 98 The rule required the current price of the
stock to be higher than the last price and, via this requirement,
prevented a trader from taking a short position in a stock already in
continuous freefall. 99 Enforced by the threat of imposing criminal
liability on both principal and agents, 100 the rule was meant as a
prophylactic solution to stock price control or manipulation through
short-selling (which, it was thought, would later be remedied by
investigation and prosecution pursuant to section 9(a)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).ll Specifically, it is illegal to
participate in "a series of transactions in any security registered on a
national securities exchange . . . creating actual or apparent active
trading in such security, or raising or depressing the price of such
security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such
security ...by others." 10 2 Proving, to the degree required by U.S.
securities law, 10 3 that one was injured by a competitor's short-selling
might well prove impossible. 10 4 And, even if an award of damages was
certain municipal bonds contrary to the bank's charter and irreconcilable with public policy); In
re E. Utils. Investing Corp., 23 F. Supp. 719 (D. Del. 1938) (discussing bankruptcy court
discovery that parent company illicitly manipulated its own stock price in attempt to defraud and
hobble debtor subsidiary). See also SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp 245 (D. Minn. 1935)
("[G]ovemment regulation and supervision in the field of securities is the result of the
unscrupulous manipulations and brazen fraud that has been practiced on the public during the
boom days[.]").
98. Rachelle Younglai & Emily Chasan, SEC Issues Emergency Rule to Curb Short Sales,
REUTERS FIN. NEWS, July 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.comarticle/newsOne/
idUSN1 533827820080716.
99. Id.
100. A customer who urges a broker to act contrary to the rule is subject to criminal liability
in equal measure to the broker who executes the instructions given under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 780) (2000).
101. This concept of "private enforcement" is central to the enforcement of the 1934 Act and
securities law more generally. See Scope of Secondary Actor Liability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 485,
489 (2008) (noting PSLRA is effectively recognition of, and limitation upon, private causes of
action under lOb-5). The line between facilitating actionable fraud and criminal aiding and
abetting is one crossed by a minority of lOb-5 defendants. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 774-76 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
difference between civil party-to-fraud liability and criminal scheme liability).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2006 & West Supp. 2008).
103. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 770-71 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11 th Cir. 1989).
104. Even testimony by Herbert Hoover, then Commerce Secretary, that short-selling in
commodities markets in the harvest season of 1920 had been undertaken by market participants
who "deliberately intended to depress the price" and that this was the proximate cause of harm to
farmers, was met with substantial skepticism. Future Trading in Grain: Taxing Contracts for the
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appropriate, it might be meaningless after the fact-no amount of
money damages could un-sink Bear Steams or revive its brand in the
marketplace.
Even with complete knowledge of the series of transactions that
adversely affected the plaintiff corporation-knowledge likely
unavailable prior to comprehensive discovery-the affected company
might still lack sufficient information to state a claim against an
aggressive, opportunistic, short-selling competitor. This is due to the
requirement that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be
alleged generally." 10 5 These rules of pleading are in place in order to
serve the three policy-driven purposes underlying rule 9(b): 1) to
provide defendants with fair notice of the claims promulgated by
plaintiffs; 2) to protect defendants from unnecessary harm that could be
caused by unfounded allegations of fraud; and 3) to reduce the number
of suits that will not meet their burden at trial. 10 6 The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995107 contains a further difficult pleading
requirement: in any action "in which the plaintiff may recover money
damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of
mind," the complaint must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind." 10 8 Illustrating the requisite mens rea when that intent must be
shared by a corporation's board, or unanimously adopted by those
managing a corporate treasury, would be difficult even under the very
best evidentiary circumstances.10 9
Financial institutions are particularly fragile when struck by a wave
of shorts by competitors, especially when this is accompanied by
negative news 110 about the company in question (even if the news
Sale of Grain for Future Delivery, and Options for Such Contracts, and Profiding for the
Regulation of Boards of Trade and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 5676 Before the Comm.
On Agriculture and Forestry, 67th Cong. 174 (1921) (statement of Herbert Hoover, Commerce
Secretary). Today's short-selling, as discussed here, happens in far more complex, far more
efficient equities markets where the causal chain may be very difficult to untangle.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
106. See DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1987)
(delineating these three purposes); O'Brien v. Price Waterhouse, 740 F. Supp. 276, 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), affd sub nom. O'Brien v. Nat'l Prop. Analyst Partners, 936 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1991).
107. Commonly known as the "PLSRA" or Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(subsequently codified in 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (b)(2) (2006).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (b)(2).
110. Alan Schwartz, CEO of Bear Steams, asserted on March 14, 2008:
Bear Steams has been subject to a significant amount of rumor and innuendo over the
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involved is not particularly revelatory and indisputably true) since these
companies depend upon the public's confidence. The vulnerability of
many publicly-traded enterprises and the lack of legal recourse after the
fact may well be enough to create a "gentleman's agreement"-a social
contract of sorts I I 1-that permeates the business culture.
Understanding the existence of a "thou shalt not bet against thy
competitor" rule, even without understanding its underlying premise,
may so saturate the business culture as to present social norms adopted
by most businesspeople. However, even if the vast majority of actors
cooperate with this rule, assenting to a Lockean social contract of sorts,
are they acting rationally? This is, perhaps, best illustrated by
considering a market segment like banking where organizations tend to
be savvy as to the market generally but relatively opaque as to one
another.
Example Ill. What Do Competitors Know and When Do They Know
It?
It is rational for a bank that may or may not compete with Bear
Steams to buy puts on Bear Stearns as it withdraws its own business
from Bear Steams. It is also rational, though risky, for such a bank to
take a short position in Bear Steams in the same situation-especially if
exposed to information on the street which seems to overwhelmingly
suggest that others are also pulling business away from Bear Steams.
Unless there is fraud, collusion, or corporate espionage afoot, it is
unlikely the bank pursuing this strategy has inside information relative
past week. We attempted to try to provide some facts to the situation but in the market
environment we're in, the rumors intensified and given the nervousness in the market a
lot of people it seemed wanted to act to protect themselves from the possibility of
rumors being true and didn't want to wait to see the facts,
at a time when 29,000 put contracts had traded at a $20 strike price with essentially no one biting.
David Gaffen, The Bear Stearns Conference Call, WALL ST. J., http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/
2008/03/14/the-bear-stearns-conference-call (Mar. 14, 2008, 12:39pm). The call failed to dispel
negative rumors, and downward momentum continued, with the stock down 39%. Id. The same
damage from rumors has threatened hedge funds and closely-held concerns. Tim Barakett,
founder of Atticus Capital (a fund with nearly $15 billion under management as of September 1,
2008), found himself defending against rumors the fund would be liquidated and shuttered:
"We've heard these rumors as well and they're not true .... We're certainly not liquidating. In
fact we have a large net cash position and are looking for opportunities to invest capital."
Gregory Zuckerman, Big Hedge Fund Atticus Denies Rumors it is Liquidating, WALL ST. J., Sept.
4, 2008, http://online.wsj.comIarticle/SB 122056054369301101 .html?mod=2_ 1569_topbox.
Barakett was quoted as saying this in The Wall Street Journal roughly seventy-two hours after
rumors of Atticus's liquidation hit the street. Id.
111. For an excellent discussion of this issue and the possibility for collusion (or other
anticompetitive behavior) that these tacit agreements among competitors may present, see David
Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13-20 (2000)
(addressing the issue of tacit collusion with passive investment).
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to Bear Steams. Some portion of the information upon which it relies
may be rumor,1 12 even "gut instinct," but it is not improper for the bank,
its officers, and its treasury to weigh the veracity and importance of the
rumors on the street. 11 3
Could the behavior by the actor in the example be problematic, not
legally, but as a matter of public policy (harmful to the public interest or
public trust)? It is important to note that there is only liability if one
supports the reading of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to
its liberal maximum, and no court has done so. Section 10(b) makes it
unlawful for any person-including a corporate person-
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 114
It is unclear whether this "as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors" clause alone could confer
liability upon an actor merely making rational decisions as in the
example above, though this seems unlikely in the absence of the
fraud 1 15 rule lOb-5 was conceived to combat.
V. A COMBINATION OF SOCIAL NORMS AND CONCERN FOR THE MARKET
Concern for the market environment in the abstract may be a factor
that only motivates action when combined with norms set by peer
corporations.
112. On September 8, 2008, UAL (the parent company of United Airlines) released multiple
statements to quell speculation-which began with an internet rumor-that it would file for
bankruptcy for the second time in a decade. See Bloomberg News, Paper Concedes Outdated
Link, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2008, at C9 (announcing this mistake). See also Eric Dinallo, Tackle
False Rumours About Insurance Companies, FIN. TIMES, July 31, 2008,
http://www.ft.comlcms/s/O/lb447e24-5f1 0-Ildd-9IcO-000077b07658.html (discussing the effect
of these rumous on investment banks and stock prices).
113. While corporations have no duty to correct rumors rampant in the market unless the
rumors are attributable to the company in view of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006 & West Supp. 2008), a corporation's officers are protected by the
business judgment rule's presumption when acting on the basis of rumors or to dispel rumors so
long as they act reasonably. An informed basis for decision-making and an honest belief they
acted in the best interest of the corporation is sufficient whether the informed basis is sympathetic
to or contrary to the prevailing rumors in the marketplace. See Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref.
Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924) (discussing the presumption in favor of the directors who
are considered to have a bona fide regard for the interests of the corporation).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
115. "It shall be unlawful for any person... [t]o engage in any.., course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in the connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2008).
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In an experiment,' 16 researchers told a set of hotel guests that re-
using towels would be good for the environment. Researchers informed
a separate set of hotel guests that most other guests had participated in
the towel re-use program. The message that described the norm yielded
a nine percent better towel re-use rate than the purely ecological
message.
Similarly, a message that "shorting one's competitors may hurt the
market environment generally" is likely not as effective as a message
that "most of us don't short our competitors." From where might this
message originate?
It is quite unlikely that all business schools educating the corporate
treasurer-or law schools educating the general counsel-agree upon a
moral code regarding shorting one's competitors. The only logical
explanation is that goodwill is threatened unless all, in a move of
trusting reciprocity (or knowing collusion), abstain from the
behavior. 117  "The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of
man,"'1 8 and of corporations made of men, too. Once a cycle is begun
by one corporation discovering the offending behavior of its rival, the
tendency toward retribution in the markets, the media, or via a flight to
third parties (conversations with partners, suppliers, and customers, for
instance) will be present. 119 Even if the motive is not retributive, the
underlying philosophy of self-defense is pervasive and convincing,
dating from the very beginnings of modem philosophical and
theological understanding. 120  Worse, the response may be foolhardy,
116. See generally Robert B. Cialdini, Noah J. Goldstein & Vladas Griskevicius, A Room with
a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in Hotels, 35 J.
CONSUMER RES. (forthcoming 2008).
117. See generally Gilo, supra note I11.
118. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
119. Cf Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, The Moonlighting Game: An
Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution, 42 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 265 (2000)
(discussing the potentially more compelling action of retribution). Abbink, et. al, propose a game
where Player A chooses to pass money to Player B or to steal money from Player B. Id. at 267-
69. Player B can then either return money or punish Player A. Id. Despite the ability to form
non-binding contracts to attempt to "contract around" negative outcomes and encourage
cooperation or positive reciprocity, retribution was found to be far more compelling than
reciprocity. Id. at 270-74.
120. See generally David B. Kopel, The Torah and Self-Defense, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 17
(2004) (examining the Torah's teachings concerning the individual's right and duty to defend
himself and others); David B. Kopel, Self-Defense in Asian Religions, 2 LIBERTY L. REV. 79
(2007), available at http://www.davekopel.org/religion/self-defense-in-asian-religions.pdf
(analyzing the concept of self defense in the context of various Asian religion traditions); David
B. Kopel, Evolving Christian Attitudes Towards Personal and National Self-Defense (Nov. 9,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.davekopel.org/religion/evolving-
christian-attitudes.pdf (discussing the Christian religion's views towards self defense from the
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unrelated, and disproportionate, as it must be very fast in order to have
any hope of effectiveness. This tendency toward an inappropriate
response is exacerbated by the fact that judicial remedies are too slow
and too poorly-suited to combat competitor short strategies, particularly
when combined with false information in the market (which may or
may not have originated from the competitor in question). Injunctions
can halt disclosures from known parties, but they cannot effectively stop
wholesale the spread of information or the proliferation of, potentially
fatal, negative "word on the street."' 121
From a social norms perspective, the analysis becomes more
troubling. The short-selling corporation is only "successful" (from its
perspective) if the short has the intended effect of weakening the target
corporation. The target corporation's self-defense is only effective if
the short-selling corporation's "bad act" is timely uncovered, exposed,
and mitigated or retaliated against. All positive outcomes for the actors,
though they may represent "success" against each other, represent
failure to comply with prevailing social norms in the business world.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
In 2000, Sappington and Sidak noted that "[i]t would be useful, for
example, to develop a careful welfare analysis of the short selling of
competitors' stock," yet little substantial work has occurred in this
area. 122 Extant work in related areas 123 largely contains assertions alien
to, rather than within the ambit of, a policy discussion.
Undoubtedly, there are parallels between the issue of short sales in a
competitor's stock and the public policy issues central to antitrust.
Conceivably, the short-selling of a competitor could have one or more
of several motives: 1) to undermine market confidence in the
competitor; 2) to ripen the competitor for acquisition; and/or 3) to drive
the competitor from less profitable markets; or 4) to encourage the
competitor to retreat to its core products and markets. All are, not
entirely coincidentally, also goals historically associated with predatory
pricing. 124 To the extent that shorting a competitor could facilitate or
individual and communal perspectives).
121. Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 28,
2008, at A l.
122. David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Are Public Enterprises the Only Credible
Predators?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 282-83 (2000).
123. See generally Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, Toeholds and Takeovers,
107 J. POL. EcON. 427 (1999) (explaning the advantageous and disadvantageous postures in a
takeover scenario).
124. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U.
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enable consolidation that would not occur otherwise, the effects are
generally negative from a policy standpoint. A publicly traded
enterprise not vulnerable to predatory pricing or other methods of attack
may still be attacked through the markets, particularly if the short-
selling party's goal is an acquisition or a modest decline in the
enterprise's stock. 12
5
Even in cases where the short-selling strategy fails, as in Example
1,126 it is the short-selling itself that seems to offend public policy, even
if the intended harm to the shorted competitor never comes to fruition.
This is consistent with the general philosophy applied to contracts that
tend to contravene the goals of public policy:
The question [of] whether a contract is against public policy
depends upon its purpose and tendency, and not upon the fact
that no harm results from it. In other words, all agreements the
purpose of which is to create a situation which tends to operate
to the detriment of the public interest are against public policy
and void, whether in the particular case the purpose of the
agreement is or is not effectuated. For a particular undertaking
to be against public policy actual injury need not be shown; it is
enough if the potentialities for harm are present. 1
27
There is also a policy question-separate from any economic
consideration that can be measured or analyzed quantitatively-of "how
short" the market should generally be. As corporate treasuries have vast
financial resources, an all-out "short war" in a major sector would have
substantial market effects. This decade has seen the market
tremendously "short" in historical terms. In 2001, nine out of twelve
months saw record highs in terms of the portion of the market that was
"short."' 128  For instance, there were approximately six billion shares
shorted in September of 2001.129 This increase continued in the latter
half of the decade, where in the 1990s, it would have been unimaginable
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) (discussing the acceptability of predation in the marketplace as well as
certain possible remedies and court costs associated with litigating predation); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 184-96 (1976) (illustrating examples of
and the effect of predatory pricing).
125. See generally L. G. Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. L. & ECON.
259 (1966) (discussing monopolization and market control are more readily available via mergers
and acquisitions than via traditional predatory tactics).
126. See supra Example I.
127. Federoff v. Ewing, 192 N.W.2d 242, 245-46 (Mich. 1971) (quoting Mahoney v. Lincoln
Brick Co., 8 N.W.2d 883, 887-88 (Mich. 1943)).
128. Christian Berthelsen, Data Shows Heavy Airline-Stock Short-Selling, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
22, 2001, at Cl.
129. Id.
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that shares short in Ford would represent 248.9 million of its 2.26
billion shares outstanding. 1
30
While there is likely no magic number that represents the percentage
of a market or an issue that should be represented by short positions,
large short positions taken by corporate treasuries in competitors may
pose unique problems. 131  Capital diverted from other projects to
engage in this sort of speculation is not used for research and
development of new products or to explore new markets. Another
peculiarity of competitor short-selling is that companies may be willing
to absorb higher costs 132 for short-selling equities if the upside from the
transaction itself is only part of the anticipated gain (harm to confidence
in a competitor or reduction in the market capitalization of a takeover
target in the same sector would be possible other "gains").
Another policy concern is the preservation of transparency, both to
the market and to peer stakeholders. Substantial meddling in a
competitor's stock can occur with minimal disclosure, so long as the
positions taken are not overwhelming in size and so long as the
competitor does not enter bankruptcy. Percentage stake in one's
competitor, 133 relative scale of competitors' operations, 134 and action
versus indifference and inaction1 35 are basic screens used by courts to
define the line between permissible behavior and bad acts.
130. Douglas A. McIntyre, NYSE Short Interest: Investors Turn Against Finance and Auto
Stocks, 24/7 WALL ST., March 22, 2008, http://www.247wallst.com/2008/03/nyse-short-in-
1 .html.
131. See e.g., Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 15 U. PA. L.
REV. 1021, 1073-74 (2007) (discussing the complexities of large short positions held by various
competitors in the context of a pending merger).
132. For a summary of costs borne by those participating in the "short" market, see generally
Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short Sale Constraints and Stock Returns (Ctr. for
Research in Sec. Prices, Working Paper No. 533, 2001), available at http://jfe.rochester.edu/
01 292.pdf.
133. See Instructions, SEC Form for Schedule 13G, available at http://www.secfile.net/forrns/
sched13g.pdf; Instructions, SEC Form for Schedule 13D, available at
http://www.secfile.net/forms/schedl3d.pdf at 3 (stating requirement for reporting percentage of
the company beneficially owned).
134. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 18-24 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that social or
judicial interest in intervention may be higher where competing actors are of disparate size or
differing market power).
135. See John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law,
36 HOUS. L. REV. 397, 400 (1999) (stating that "the questions raised by necessity cases can be
restated as questions of culpability").
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Example IV. Do Threshold Stakeholder Rules Make Sense?
Tango and Uniform are publicly-traded competitors in jurisdiction
Zulu. In Zulu, there must be public filings and disclosures whenever a
person, natural-born or a creature of the law, owns a stake representing
five percent or more of the outstanding shares of a publicly traded
entity. There are one hundred shares of Uniform outstanding. On
January 1, Tango's treasury short-sells four shares of Uniform, planning
to cover its short on January 15. On January 8, Tango's treasury short-
sells another four shares, planning to cover on January 22. On January
15, Tango's treasury short-sells four more shares, planning to cover on
January 29. Because Tango only takes a possessory 136 interest at the
time it sells, and only holds an obligation to cover in the meantime,
Tango never "owns" more than five percent of Uniform. Each time
Tango covers its short in Uniform, it only buys four shares of Uniform
and immediately uses them to cover its short. Using this method, Tango
could potentially have a substantial effect on Uniform's stock without
any additional disclosure burden in Zulu.
Uniform could, of course, utilize its resources to "defend" against a
general short-selling campaign or piling-on by investors other than
Tango. For example, "[n]ot long before Tyco went bankrupt it was still
buying full-page advertisements to campaign against short-selling."' 137
Firms may resort to legal threats and even maintain suit138 in order to
discourage short-selling. Having to "defend" in the first place,
however, particularly against one's competitors in the marketplace,
creates dubious incentives largely contrary to good public policy.
At some level, the public (and the markets, if the two are not
synonymous) accepts a certain behavior, perhaps begrudgingly, when
necessary even though these behaviors would be found morally
reprehensible in another context. Take the following two examples.
Example V(a). David and Goliath.
BigCo and LittleCo are companies in the same sector. BigCo
manufactures the Obligatory Widget, something almost everyone buys
at a reasonable price. LittleCo manufactures the Niche Widget,
something some people buy at a higher price. BigCo has an upcoming
136. The short-seller has a mere possessory interest in another's shares and a contractual
obligation to cover until he or she takes title to shares in order to cover the short at a subsequent
date. TOM TAULLI, WHAT IS SHORT SELLING 3-4 (2004).
137. Don't Shoot the Messenger-Why Short-Selling Should Be Encouraged, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 1,2003, at 78, 78.
138. See generally, Owen A. Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms, (NBER,
Working Paper No. W10659, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=579806 (studying the
variety of methods used by firms to impede short-selling such as legal threats and litigation).
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product, the Super Widget, that it is ninety-five percent sure will be the
final, crushing blow to put LittleCo out of business. The Super Widget
does everything the Niche Widget does at a fraction of the price. The
day before launching the Super Widget, BigCo shorts LittleCo. BigCo
makes a great deal of money selling Super Widgets, claims essentially
one-hundred percent of LittleCo's market share, and profits on its short-
selling as LittleCo spirals into bankruptcy.
Example V(b). David and David.
IffyCo and MaybeCo are small companies in the same sector. IffyCo
comes out with a new product, Super Widget, that it believes will be
successful, perhaps at the expense of MaybeCo. IffyCo shorts
MaybeCo and makes a modest profit on its short-sale play, but it is not
substantial compared to its profit from the new product.
Many people would find BigCo's conduct more objectionable than
IffyCo's conduct. This is because people have difficulty visualizing
abstract relationships and, instead, superimpose the moral principles and
social niceties they've learned elsewhere onto corporate entities. 139
Add to Example V(a) that BigCo and LittleCo were not long ago
(perhaps prior to a spin-off) the same company, or companies with
generally aligned interests in the same industry. Now, the opportunistic
short-selling of LittleCo by BigCo seems more outrageous, with a whiff
of corporate filicide.
This concept of "betrayal" is what made Jeff Skilling's shorting of
AES so newsworthy to the Wall Street Journal. There was not then,
and has not been since, any substantiated allegation 140 that Skilling's
shorting of AES was based upon inside information, was improper or
criminal. Rather, AES and Enron were competitors with generally
aligned interests relatively peacefully coexisting in the market until
news of Skilling's trade. To the extent that large-scale short-selling
fosters bitter relationships within a sector rather than gentlemanly
competition, most will consider the practice counterproductive from a
public policy standpoint. This bias evidences itself in both civil 141 and
criminal 142 law. While "fair competition" may not be an easy standard
139. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 28-30 (1999).
140. Skilling was found guilty as to insider trading concerning the sale of 500,000 shares of
Enron stock on September 17, 2001. See generally United States v. Skilling, No. H-04-025-02,
2006 WL 3030721 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2006) (detailing the allegations and the Supreme Court's
decision denying Skilling's various motions relating to his guilty verdict). He was never charged
regarding the AES short sale transaction.
141. Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the
Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 17-18 (1993).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 448-49 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that in
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for courts to apply, 143 it seems an easier standard for investors to
internalize. If people are analogizing short-selling to something else
that they intuitively believe is contrary to public policy, this could
explain the moral dilemma at work when BigCo shorts LittleCo or when
Unfriendly Skies shorts United immediately after September 11,
200.144
Of course, many companies will argue in retrospect that the
competitor was in dire straits from the beginning. To ask the company
to forego the potential gains available from short-selling its competitor's
stock is unfair and distorts the market. But, "without the short-selling,
and the accompanying rumors on Wall Street, the company could have
been saved from bankruptcy," the shorted competitor will inevitably
argue. 145  Is it, then, incrementally nobler to let one's competitor die
peacefully than to speed its decline with a series of well-timed short
sales?
Example VI. Inaction.
Alpha and Bravo are close friends. Bravo has a painful, irreversible,
terminal illness and has given Alpha medical power of attorney. Bravo
has executed legal documents stating that she does not want
extraordinary measures taken to prolong her life in this type of scenario.
Alpha stands by while Bravo dies, though Alpha could act to prolong
Bravo's life.
Example VII. Action. 146
Charlie and Delta are close friends and medical doctors. They have a
mutual agreement that if either has a painful, irreversible, terminal
illness, the other will painlessly terminate the afflicted individual's life.
Delta contracts a painful, irreversible, terminal illness. Charlie injects
Delta with poison, causing Delta's prompt and painless death.
While both Bravo and Delta die, most draw a moral distinction
between the two deaths. 147 Alpha's inaction is morally superior, many
a securities case the district court judge properly cited defendant's facilitation of crime through
betrayal of defendant's friends to justify harsher sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
143. See generally Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (rejecting "fairness" of
competition as legal workable standard); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935) (rejecting the same).
144. See supra Example II.
145. This is exactly the argument made by Bear Stearns executives in fall of 2008, first to the
press, then to Congress, then to the Attorney General's office. Jenny Anderson, A New Wave of
Villifying Short Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2008, at Cl.
146. Examples VI and VII were inspired, in part, by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting
Die, and the Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY
78, 80-93 (William Parent ed., 1986).
147. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics 9-10 (Univ. of Chic. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law &
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would argue, to Charlie's action. Most will also draw a public policy
distinction that the personal choice requiring no affirmative act in
Example VI can be allowed, while allowing affirmative acts that cause
the death of another in Example VII could make for bad policy. 148
Business failures due to healthy competition can be analogized to
"death by natural causes," or Bravo's death in Example VI. Meanwhile,
BigCo's short-trading strategy against LittleCo better matches the
affirmative step taken by Charlie to kill Delta in Example VII.
Examples VIII and IX illustrate the philosophical quandary as to
whether advancing one's own interests is morally superior to interfering
with the interests of a nearby competitor, even if they produce largely
indistinguishable gains.
Example VIII. Conferred Advantage.
Druggist knows with absolute certainty that if he gives a certain
injection, GoFast, to his racehorse, the horse will run two percent faster,
enough to ensure that it wins the race. GoFast has no negative health
effects and Druggist knows (to the degree of absolute certainty) that the
horse will not be harmed in the long-run if he administers GoFast.
There is a risk, however, that the horse will slightly disappoint relative
to future, higher expectations. He administers GoFast and his horse
wins while the rival horse loses.
Example IX. Conferred Disadvantage.
Druggist knows with absolute certainty that if he gives a certain
injection, GoSlow, to a rival racehorse, that the horse will run two
percent more slowly, enough to ensure that it will not win the race.
GoSlow has no negative health effects, and Druggist knows (to the
degree of absolute certainty) that the horse will not be harmed in the
long-run by GoSlow. There is a risk, however, that the horse will be
seen as an underperformer and will be euthanized or retired due to the
poor performance. If the horse is euthanized or retired, there is a very
small chance that Druggist's participation in the scheme will be
uncovered. He administers GoSlow, and the rival horse loses while
Druggist's horse wins.
Presuming that in Examples VIII and IX Druggist has access to both
horses without committing a tort or crime and that his only motive is to
manipulate the outcome of wagers placed on the horse race for profit,
Econ., Working Paper No. 180, 2003), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/
WkngPprs_176-200/180.crs.moral.pdf.
148. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730, 734 (1997) (noting statistics of the
Netherlands where physician-assisted suicide, once legalized, caused apparent upward trend in
involuntary euthanasia).
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most will contend that, while both are objectionable, administering
GoFast to his own horse is less objectionable than administering
GoSlow to the rival horse for the same reasons investors and actors in
the marketplace would rather see companies triumph through
competition than manipulate each others' prices through a short-selling
trading strategy. The euthanasia or retirement possibility in Example IX
represents the bankruptcy of the target corporation. The small chance
of Druggist's involvement being discovered represents the small chance
a broad ownership disclosure will be required in bankruptcy that will
trigger revelations regarding the short-selling strategy a competitor
undertook.
This series of examples illustrates the basis for a general public
policy preference for corporations to fail in the midst of competition
rather than due to the affirmative acts of competitors. This preference is
likely derived from the broader preference for incrementally "less
affirmative" acts where the underlying acts might be considered bad
acts. 149 It also reflects the preference for actors who pursue their own
success rather than focusing their efforts on facilitating a rival's failure.
Lastly, it reflects the preference for harms that are less personal-
Skilling's short-selling of his company's competitor is morally "worse"
than the same action taken by someone who knows little about the
industry.
However, Examples VI through IX, while interesting philosophically,
are insufficient practically. They inaccurately portray the relationships
between competitors in the marketplace and poorly mirror the effects of
a short-selling strategy executed by one competitor against another.
They do serve to illustrate, however, that "harmful acts are generally
worse than harmful omissions, in terms of both the state of mind of the
wrongdoer and the likely consequences of the wrong."']50
149. For a famous mid-century fantastic dilemma on the topic see Judith Jarvis Thomson, The
Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY, supra note
146, at 94-116 (describing the actor with the choice of diverting a trolley that will surely hit five
men onto a track where one man will be killed). More applicable to the question at hand is the
variation (based on the work of modern Aristotelian ethicist Philippa Foot and developed further
by Judith Jarvis Thomson at M.I.T.) of the problem where subjects must choose between having
the actor throw a switch to put the trolley on course to kill one person (to avoid the death of five)
or to throw a man off the bridge nearby (which will surely kill the man but equally surely stop the
trolley). In one recent study, eighty-nine percent of participants thought throwing the switch to
divert the trolley was a moral choice, but only eleven percent considered throwing the man from
the bridge moral, despite either's resulting in the loss of an innocent life. See Marc Hauser, Liane
Young & Fiery Cushman, Reviving Rawls' Linguistic Analogy, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
BIOLOGY (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 15-22, on file with author).
150. Sunstein, supra note 147, at 9.
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The question from a public policy standpoint, then, is whether a short
sale by a competitor is a harmful act. If the short-selling is a harmful
act, and actionable, then our system provides the legal framework with
which to examine the proximity of causation and apportion
responsibility for the resulting harm. 15 1  If this short-selling by a
competitor is suspect, 152 but not actionable, then it may be difficult to
discourage with current securities market regulatory tools. If this type
of short-selling is not a harmful act, then it poses no public policy
concern, regardless of the practice's prevalence.
This public policy concern stems not solely from peculiarly
philosophical quarters, but also from economic concerns. Recent
research 153 increasingly shows that actors in the marketplace are not
predictable, self-interested entities; rather, they are interested in fairness
and reciprocity. This concern in the marketplace, combined with
concern for any activity perceived to jeopardize the credibility and
stability of markets, leads many-including this author-to believe that
rampant short-selling between competitors is a matter of public concern,
whether or not it is a "harmful act" in a tort sense, or the proximate
cause of any harm. Instead, it is the breach of a social contract between
actors that is, itself, the impropriety-and damage to reputation, if
discovered, is the primary deterrence.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the buying of options on one's competitor and the short-selling
of a competitor's stock is legally permissible, this remains a relatively
rare practice. When substantial trades in a competitor's stock occur,
they are likely to be subject to deliberation and scrutiny at the highest
levels. Any corporation considering the practice must weigh the risks
of discovery, negative media attention, and offending prevailing
business etiquette.
151. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (describing the
various factors taken into consideration regarding apportionment of blame for an employer's
decision); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 at 266-
67 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing various factors involved in determining causation).
152. Many actions taken by management may be suspect, but not actionable. See, e.g., Lewis
v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that suspect, but not unlawful,
failure to disclose management's self-serving motive in defending against takeover is not
actionable under the securities acts).
153. See generally Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity-
Evidence and Economic Applications (CESifo, Working Paper Series No. 403 and Univ. of
Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research, Working Paper No. 75, 2000), available at
http://ssrn.conabstract=255223.
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Regulation barring such trades, even if desirable in theory, will
generally be more difficult and more expensive to maintain than
already-extant social norms. 154 Much as workers' expectations of their
peers may be more effective in enforcing a workplace dress code than a
rule alone, 155 a similar fear of disapproval, criticism, and loss of social
currency prevents most corporations from actively trading in or
engaging in short-sales of competitors' stock.
Further, as most corporations do not have substantially better
information about their competitors than is prevalent in the market
generally, short sales or the buying of puts against a competitor's stock
rarely present a value proposition superior to other uses for funds in the
treasury. This lack of any information advantage, combined with a
threat of being discovered or "shamed" by peers, 156 is sufficient to
dissuade the majority of potential actors. In the end, concern for the
corporation's reputation, for the market, and for the integrity of
prevailing norms and public policy will discourage most corporations
from making substantial treasury investments in their competitors, be
they long or short.
154. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 282-83 (1991) (summarizing the
effects of a "social-control" system).
155. Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the
New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 13, 122 (2007).
156. See Abigail Barr, Social Dilemmas and Shame-Based Sanctions: Experimental Results
from Rural Zimbabwe 3-5 (Univ. of Oxford Ctr. for the Study of African Economies, Working
Paper Series No. 2001.11, 2001), available at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/
2001-11 text.pdf (analyzing shaming as an effective deterrent measure).
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